

Passage 1: Land Acquisition, Public Purpose, and Judicial Review

The State of Aarav enacted the "Public Infrastructure Acquisition Act, 2024" (PIAA), which allows the government to acquire private land for "public infrastructure projects" upon payment of "fair market value" as determined by a government-appointed valuer. The Act defines "public infrastructure" broadly to include roads, railways, ports, and "any project certified by the State Cabinet as essential to economic development." Affected landowners may appeal the valuation to a specialized tribunal within 30 days, but the tribunal's powers are limited to adjusting the compensation amount; it cannot question whether the acquisition serves a public purpose.

In 2025, the State Cabinet certified a 200-acre tract in the rural district of Mirzapur as essential for a "technology corridor" to be developed by a private consortium, TechCorr Ltd. The land includes ancestral farmland, a small temple, and a community well used by three villages. The government issued acquisition notices under PIAA, offering compensation based on registered sale deeds from the past two years. Several landowners objected, arguing that the project primarily benefits a private company, not the public, and that the valuation ignored the land's agricultural productivity and cultural significance.

The High Court of Aarav, hearing a batch of petitions, noted that while the Constitution permits acquisition for public purpose with compensation, it also requires that laws affecting property rights not be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The Court observed that "public purpose" cannot be a mere label; there must be a rational nexus between the acquisition and a genuine public need. However, the Court also recognized the legislature's wide discretion in economic policy and stated that judicial review should focus on procedural fairness and the absence of bad faith, rather than substituting the Court's view of what constitutes optimal development.

The State argued that the technology corridor would create thousands of jobs, improve connectivity, and attract investment, thereby serving a public purpose even if a private entity executes the project. Petitioners countered that the Act's ouster of judicial scrutiny over "public purpose" effectively insulates executive certification from constitutional scrutiny, violating the rule of law. They further contended that "fair market value" based solely on past sale deeds fails to account for future income potential, displacement costs, and non-market values such as community cohesion and religious sentiment.

A dissenting judge warned that allowing the executive to define "public purpose" without meaningful review could enable the state to transfer land from vulnerable communities to powerful private interests under the guise of development. The majority, however, held that while the scheme is not perfect, it does not cross the threshold of unconstitutionality so long as the tribunal ensures transparent valuation and the government demonstrate a plausible public benefit. The Court directed the State to publish a detailed project report and conduct public hearings before finalizing acquisitions, but declined to strike down the certification or the valuation method.

Q1. Which of the following best captures the core legal tension in the passage?

- A. Whether compensation should be based on past sale deeds or future income potential.
- B. Whether the executive's certification of 'public purpose' should be completely immune from judicial review.
- C. Whether rural land should be acquired for urban development projects.
- D. Whether private companies should be allowed to participate in infrastructure projects at all.

Q2. If the legislature amended PIAA to allow the tribunal to examine whether a project serves a 'public purpose', which outcome is most likely under the reasoning of the majority?

- A. The amendment would have no practical effect because courts cannot assess economic policy.
- B. The amendment would automatically invalidate all prior acquisitions under the Act.
- C. The amendment would be unconstitutional because it infringes the executive's policy-making domain.
- D. The amendment would likely be upheld as enhancing procedural fairness without undermining legislative discretion.

Q3. Which argument, if accepted, would most strongly support the petitioners' claim that the valuation method is constitutionally inadequate?

- A. Proof that the government deliberately undervalued land to reduce compensation costs.
- B. Testimony that some landowners are willing to sell at the offered price.
- C. Data showing that agricultural productivity has declined in the region over the past decade.
- D. Evidence that similar land in urban areas fetches higher prices.

Q4. Suppose the State later acquires land for a luxury resort certified as 'essential to economic development'. Based on the passage, which challenge is most likely to succeed?

- A. That the certification is unconstitutional because it lacks a rational nexus to genuine public need.
- B. That the tribunal must automatically reject any acquisition benefiting a private entity.
- C. That private resorts can never qualify as public infrastructure under any interpretation.
- D. That the Constitution prohibits any acquisition for tourism-related projects.

Q5. Which change to PIAA would most directly address the dissenting judge's concern about power imbalances?

- A. Requiring independent social impact assessments and community consent for acquisitions affecting vulnerable groups.
- B. Shortening the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to expedite projects.
- C. Allowing the State Cabinet to delegate certification to district collectors.
- D. Increasing the compensation rate by a fixed percentage for all acquisitions.

Passage 2: Hate Speech, Platform Liability, and Free Expression

The Republic of Indrapura enacted the "Digital Speech and Safety Act, 2025" (DSSA), which imposes duties on "significant social media intermediaries" (SSMIs) to remove content flagged as "hate speech" within 24 hours of receiving a government notice. Hate speech is defined as any communication that "promotes hostility or violence against a group identified by religion, ethnicity, caste, gender, or sexual orientation." Failure to comply attracts heavy fines and potential criminal liability for platform executives. The Act also requires SSMIs to deploy automated tools to proactively detect and block such content, even before any user complaint.

A coalition of digital rights groups challenged DSSA, arguing that the 24-hour takedown mandate and proactive monitoring obligations chill legitimate expression, encourage over-removal, and effectively outsource censorship to private platforms. They contend that the definition of hate speech is overly broad and vague, risking the suppression of satire, academic discussion, and political criticism. The government defended the law as necessary to prevent real-world violence, citing several incidents where online rhetoric allegedly incited mob attacks.

The Supreme Court of Indrapura, in its judgment, acknowledged the state's interest in preventing violence but emphasized that restrictions on speech must be narrowly tailored, clearly defined, and subject to adequate safeguards against abuse. The Court noted that while platforms can be regulated, imposing strict liability for third-party content without meaningful notice-and-hearing mechanisms risks transforming intermediaries into arbiters of lawful speech. It further observed that automated detection tools are prone to errors, especially with context-dependent speech such as irony, reclaimed slurs, or historical analysis.

The Court struck down the proactive monitoring obligation as disproportionate, holding that it places an undue burden on platforms and incentivizes blanket removal of borderline content. However, it upheld the 24-hour takedown rule for government-flagged content, provided that: (i) notices specify the exact content and legal basis; (ii) platforms may seek clarification before removal in complex cases; and (iii) users whose content is removed have access to a swift, independent appeal mechanism. The Court directed the legislature to narrow the hate speech definition to cover only speech that directly incites imminent violence or discrimination, in line with international standards.

In a concurring opinion, one judge warned that even with safeguards, the threat of severe penalties may lead platforms to err on the side of censorship, disproportionately affecting marginalized voices that discuss discrimination or use strong language to describe oppression. The majority responded that the prescribed appeal mechanism and the requirement for precise notices should mitigate this risk, but acknowledged that the law's implementation would require close judicial oversight.

Q6. Which principle best explains the Court's decision to strike down proactive monitoring but uphold the 24-hour takedown rule with safeguards?

- A. Restrictions on speech must be proportionate, clearly defined, and include safeguards against abuse.
- B. Government notices must always be obeyed immediately without any possibility of clarification.
- C. Platforms should never be held responsible for user-generated content under any circumstances.
- D. All restrictions on speech are unconstitutional unless they target only false statements.

Q7. If the legislature narrows the hate speech definition as directed, which type of speech would most likely remain regulable under DSSA?

- A. A post explicitly calling for immediate violence against members of a specific ethnic group.
- B. A satirical meme mocking political leaders without referencing protected groups.
- C. A scholarly article critiquing religious doctrines using strong language.
- D. A personal blog describing experiences of caste discrimination without inciting hostility.

Q8. Which scenario would most strongly illustrate the concurring judge's concern about marginalized voices?

- A. A platform removes a post by a minority activist describing systemic oppression using emotionally charged language.
- B. A platform removes a post advertising a commercial product with misleading claims.
- C. A platform removes a post by a dominant political party criticizing opposition policies.
- D. A platform removes a post containing clear threats of violence against a public official.

Q9. Suppose the government issues a vague notice flagging an entire user profile as 'potentially hateful' without specifying posts. Under the Court's guidelines, what is the platform's best course of action?

- A. Immediately delete the entire profile to avoid penalties.
- B. Ignore the notice entirely because it does not comply with the law.
- C. Seek clarification from the government before removal, citing the requirement for precise notices.
- D. Remove only the most recent post from the profile as a precaution.

Q10. Which reform would most effectively address the risk of automated tools misclassifying context-dependent speech?

- A. Banning the use of any automated tools for content moderation under all circumstances.
- B. Increasing fines for platforms that fail to remove flagged content within 12 hours instead of 24.
- C. Mandating that all automated removals be reviewed by a government official before taking effect.
- D. Requiring platforms to maintain human oversight and allow users to contest automated decisions quickly.

Passage 3: Surveillance, Privacy, and Judicial Authorization

The Kingdom of Varnia passed the "National Security and Data Access Act, 2024" (NSDAA), authorizing law enforcement agencies to access "communication metadata" and "location history" from telecom providers without a judicial warrant, provided a senior officer certifies that the data is necessary for "preventing or investigating serious offenses." The Act defines serious offenses to include terrorism, organized crime, and corruption. Providers must comply within 6 hours and are prohibited from informing the affected users about the data request. Affected individuals may file a complaint with an oversight board within 90 days, but the board's recommendations are non-binding.

Civil liberties organizations challenged NSDAA, arguing that blanket warrantless access to metadata and location history violates the constitutional right to privacy and enables mass surveillance. They emphasized that metadata and location patterns can reveal intimate details about a person's associations, habits, and beliefs, even without accessing message content. The government countered that requiring warrants would impede time-sensitive investigations and that the senior-officer certification provides sufficient internal oversight.

The Constitutional Court of Varnia held that while the state has a legitimate interest in combating serious crime, privacy is a fundamental right that cannot be overridden by vague statutory language or unfettered executive discretion. The Court distinguished between limited, targeted data access in genuine emergencies and broad, routine warrantless collection. It found that NSDAA's lack of judicial authorization, combined with the gag order and weak oversight, created a high risk of abuse and arbitrary invasions of privacy.

The Court struck down the warrantless access provision, ruling that access to communication metadata and location history generally requires prior approval from an independent judicial authority, except in narrowly defined emergencies where obtaining a warrant is practically impossible. In such emergencies, agencies must seek retroactive judicial validation within 24 hours, and any data obtained without subsequent validation must be excluded from evidence. The Court also invalidated the gag order, holding that users must be notified of data access within a reasonable time unless a court specifically delays notification to protect an ongoing investigation.

In a separate opinion, one judge argued that the oversight board should be empowered to issue binding orders and impose penalties for misuse, but the majority concluded that only judicial authorization can provide adequate checks on executive power. The Court directed the legislature to enact a comprehensive data protection framework specifying retention limits, access logs, and remedies for unlawful surveillance.

Q11. Which constitutional principle most directly underlies the Court's decision to strike down warrantless access?

- A. The absolute prohibition on any government access to personal data under any circumstances.
- B. The requirement that restrictions on fundamental rights be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.
- C. The preference for legislative oversight over judicial oversight in all security matters.
- D. The state's duty to ensure national security at all costs.

Q12. Under the Court's ruling, in which scenario would warrantless access to location data most likely be permissible?

- A. Accessing a politician's location data based on an anonymous tip without further verification.
- B. Accessing a journalist's location data to identify their sources in a corruption investigation.
- C. Accessing a suspect's location data during an ongoing terrorist attack when obtaining a warrant is practically impossible.
- D. Routine monitoring of all citizens' location data to detect potential criminal activity.

Q13. Which reform would most effectively reduce the risk of arbitrary invasions of privacy identified by the Court?

- A. Increasing the penalty for telecom providers that fail to comply within 6 hours.
- B. Empowering the oversight board to issue binding orders and impose penalties for misuse.
- C. Extending the complaint filing period from 90 days to 180 days.
- D. Requiring prior judicial authorization for access, with narrow emergency exceptions and retroactive validation.

Q14. If the legislature enacts a new law allowing delayed notification to users for up to one year in all corruption cases, how would this likely fare under the Court's reasoning?

- A. It would be upheld if the oversight board approves each delay.
- B. It would be irrelevant because users have no right to know about data access.
- C. It would be struck down as overly broad, since delayed notification must be specifically justified by a court.
- D. It would be upheld because corruption is a serious offense.

Q15. Which argument best supports the government's position that senior-officer certification is insufficient oversight?

- A. Senior officers are not trained to understand technical aspects of data collection.
- B. Internal executive certification lacks independence and creates a high risk of abuse and arbitrary invasions.
- C. Telecom providers cannot verify the authenticity of senior-officer certifications.
- D. Senior officers are always biased against suspects in corruption cases.

Passage 4: Intergenerational Equity, Environmental Clearances, and Reasoned Decisions

The Union of Kalyon adopted the "Sustainable Development and Intergenerational Equity Act, 2025" (SDIEA), which mandates that all major industrial projects undergo an "intergenerational impact assessment" (IIA) in addition to traditional environmental clearances. The IIA must evaluate how a project affects the ability of future generations to meet their needs, considering factors such as resource depletion, climate change contributions, and irreversible ecological damage. The Act establishes a "Future Generations Council" (FGC) with the power to recommend project modifications or rejections if the IIA indicates severe long-term harm. However, the final decision rests with the Ministry of Environment, which must record reasons if it deviates from the FGC's recommendations.

A proposed coal-fired power plant in the ecologically sensitive region of Greenvalley received conditional clearance after the FGC recommended rejection, citing high carbon emissions, water scarcity risks, and the availability of renewable alternatives. The Ministry approved the project, reasoning that immediate energy needs and employment generation outweigh long-term environmental concerns, and that the plant would adopt "best available technology" to minimize emissions. Local communities and environmental groups challenged the approval, arguing that the Ministry failed to provide adequate reasons for overriding the FGC and ignored the statutory mandate to prioritize intergenerational equity.

The High Court of Kalyon emphasized that sustainable development requires balancing present needs with the rights of future generations, and that procedural safeguards like the IIA and FGC recommendations are central to this balance. The Court held that while the Ministry is not bound to follow the FGC's recommendations, it must provide reasoned, evidence-based justifications for any deviation, demonstrating that it genuinely considered long-term impacts. The Court found the Ministry's reliance on generic assertions about energy needs and employment insufficient, especially given the availability of renewable options and the region's ecological vulnerability.

The Court set aside the clearance and remanded the matter, directing the Ministry to either accept the FGC's recommendation or provide a detailed, project-specific analysis showing how the project's long-term harms are mitigated or outweighed by compelling public benefits. The judgment also clarified that "best available technology" does not absolve the state of its duty to consider whether the project type itself is compatible with intergenerational equity, particularly in ecologically sensitive areas.

In a concurring note, one judge suggested that the FGC should have binding veto power in cases of irreversible harm, but the majority preferred to retain ministerial accountability while strengthening reasoned decision-making. The Court urged the legislature to consider stricter thresholds for projects in ecologically sensitive zones, including presumptive rejection unless no feasible alternatives exist.

Q16. Which legal principle is most central to the Court's reasoning in setting aside the project clearance?

- A. All coal-fired power plants are unconstitutional regardless of technology or location.
- B. Economic development always takes precedence over environmental concerns.
- C. The FGC's recommendations must always be binding on the Ministry.
- D. Procedural safeguards and reasoned decision-making are essential to uphold intergenerational equity.

Q17. If the Ministry later approves the same project with a detailed analysis showing that renewable alternatives are infeasible and that long-term harms are minimized, what is the likely outcome?

- A. The approval would likely be upheld if the analysis is project-specific, evidence-based, and addresses intergenerational impacts.
- B. The approval would be valid only if the FGC changes its recommendation.
- C. The approval would be invalid because coal plants can never be justified in ecologically sensitive areas.
- D. The approval would be automatically invalid because the FGC previously recommended rejection.

Q18. Which change to SDIEA would most directly address the concurring judge's concern about irreversible harm?

- A. Granting the FGC binding veto power in cases where the IIA indicates irreversible ecological damage.
- B. Excluding small-scale projects from the IIA requirement to expedite development.
- C. Reducing the time limit for completing IIAs from six months to three months.
- D. Allowing the Ministry to delegate its decision-making authority to district-level officers.

Q19. Suppose the legislature creates an exception allowing fast-track clearance for projects deemed 'critical to national security' without IIA. Under the Court's reasoning, this exception would most likely:

- A. Be irrelevant because the Court has no authority over national security matters.
- B. Be upheld if the FGC is consulted informally.
- C. Be struck down as undermining the core procedural safeguards intended to protect intergenerational equity.
- D. Be upheld because national security always overrides environmental concerns.

Q20. Which argument best supports the environmental groups' claim that the Ministry's approval was procedurally flawed?

- A. The Ministry did not consult the local community before approving the project.
- B. The Ministry relied on generic assertions about energy needs without project-specific, evidence-based reasoning on long-term impacts.
- C. The FGC's recommendation was unanimous, which should make it binding.
- D. The project would increase electricity prices for consumers.

Passage 5: Gig Workers, Algorithmic Control, and Labor Classification

The Federal Republic of Meridia enacted the "Gig Worker Protection and Classification Act, 2025" (GWPCA), which creates a new category of "dependent contractors" for platform-based workers who derive at least 50% of their income from a single digital platform and are subject to algorithmic control over work allocation, pricing, and performance evaluation. Dependent contractors are entitled to minimum earnings guarantees, limited working-hour protections, and access to social security benefits, but are not classified as employees and thus do not receive full labor rights such as collective bargaining or protection against arbitrary termination.

A coalition of ride-hailing and delivery drivers filed a petition, arguing that the dependent contractor category is a legal fiction that denies them full employee status despite being functionally controlled by platforms through algorithms, ratings, and deactivation threats. They contend that the 50% income threshold is arbitrary and excludes many workers who are equally dependent but diversify across platforms out of necessity. The platforms countered that classifying all gig workers as employees would undermine flexibility, increase costs, and reduce opportunities for part-time earners.

The Supreme Court of Meridia observed that the essence of an employment relationship lies in subordination and control, not merely in the label parties assign to their contract. The Court noted that algorithmic management can replicate traditional employer control by dictating when, where, and how work is performed, and by imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, the Court also recognized that some gig workers genuinely value flexibility and may not desire full-time employment status.

The Court upheld the dependent contractor category but directed the legislature to: (i) lower the income threshold to 30% to cover more workers; (ii) require platforms to disclose key algorithmic parameters affecting work allocation and pay; and (iii) allow dependent contractors to form associations with limited collective bargaining rights on issues such as minimum rates and deactivation policies. The Court emphasized that these measures should balance protection with flexibility, and that the classification framework must be periodically reviewed to reflect evolving work patterns.

In a dissenting opinion, one judge argued that the Court should have recognized all gig workers subject to algorithmic control as employees, with full labor rights, reasoning that anything less perpetuates precarity and allows platforms to externalize risks onto workers. The majority responded that a gradual, calibrated approach is more feasible given the diversity of gig work and the need to avoid disrupting the entire sector at once.

Q21. Which criterion does the Court identify as most important in determining whether a worker should be classified as an employee?

A. The percentage of income derived from a single platform.

- B. The worker's personal preference for flexibility versus security.
- C. The platform's profitability and market share.
- D. The degree of subordination and control exercised over the worker.

Q22. If the legislature lowers the income threshold to 30% as directed, which group of workers would most likely benefit?

- A. Workers who earn 60% of their income from one platform and 40% from another.
- B. Workers who do not use digital platforms at all.
- C. Workers who earn 100% of their income from a single platform.
- D. Workers who earn 25% of their income from one platform and the rest from multiple platforms.

Q23. Which reform would most directly address the dissenting judge's concern about precarity and risk externalization?

- A. Recognizing all gig workers subject to algorithmic control as employees with full labor rights.
- B. Reducing the tax rate for platforms that hire more full-time employees.
- C. Allowing platforms to offer voluntary insurance schemes to gig workers.
- D. Requiring platforms to publish annual sustainability reports.

Q24. Suppose a platform modifies its algorithm to hide performance ratings from workers while using them to allocate work. Under the Court's directives, this practice would most likely:

- A. Be permissible as long as minimum earnings guarantees are met.
- B. Be impermissible only if workers file a formal complaint.
- C. Be permissible because algorithms are proprietary and need not be disclosed.
- D. Be impermissible because platforms must disclose key algorithmic parameters affecting work allocation and pay.

Q25. Which argument best supports the majority's preference for a calibrated approach over immediate full employee status?

- A. Gig workers uniformly prefer part-time work and reject any form of collective representation.
- B. Full employee status would automatically increase platform profits.
- C. The diversity of gig work and potential disruption to the sector warrant a gradual, evidence-based evolution of protections.
- D. Courts have no authority to order changes to labor classification laws.

Passage 6: Constitutional Morality, Religious Freedom, and Anti-Discrimination

The State of Arya prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity under its Constitution and the "Equality and Dignity Act, 2024" (EDA). However, certain religious institutions in Arya claim exemption from these provisions, arguing that their doctrines require sex-segregated roles and prohibit LGBTQ+ individuals from holding leadership positions.

A prominent temple denied a transgender woman the right to serve as a priest, citing scriptural interpretations that restrict priesthood to males born as males. The woman filed a complaint under EDA, seeking access to the priesthood and declaratory relief that the temple's policy violates constitutional morality.

The temple argued that forcing it to admit transgender priests would infringe its freedom of religion and internal autonomy to interpret doctrine. It contended that the state should not interfere in theological matters and that devotees who disagree can choose other temples. The petitioner countered that when religious institutions perform public functions and receive state benefits, they must comply with anti-discrimination norms, and that constitutional morality requires dignity and equality to override exclusionary religious practices.

The High Court of Arya held that freedom of religion is not absolute and must be balanced against fundamental rights to equality and dignity. The Court distinguished between essential religious practices, which may receive protection, and administrative or exclusionary practices that perpetuate stigma and deny equal participation. It noted that the temple receives tax exemptions and operates under state-regulated trust laws, thereby engaging with the public sphere. The Court found that excluding transgender individuals from priesthood based solely on birth sex is not an essential religious practice but a discriminatory administrative rule.

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, directing the temple to allow qualified transgender women to serve as priests and to revise its eligibility criteria accordingly. It emphasized that constitutional morality demands that religious institutions, when operating in the public domain, cannot use doctrine as a shield for discrimination. The Court also clarified that this ruling does not dictate theological beliefs but ensures that access to public religious roles is not denied on prohibited grounds.

In a concurring opinion, one judge suggested that the state should create a fund to support religious communities in transitioning to inclusive practices, but the majority held that financial incentives should not condition the enforcement of fundamental rights. The judgment has sparked debate about the limits of religious autonomy and the role of constitutional morality in reforming traditional institutions.

Q26. Which distinction is crucial to the Court's reasoning in rejecting the temple's freedom of religion defense?

- A. The difference between essential religious practices and discriminatory administrative rules.
- B. The difference between paid and unpaid priests.
- C. The difference between urban and rural temples.
- D. The difference between Hindu and non-Hindu religious institutions.

Q27. If the temple were entirely privately funded and received no state benefits or regulatory oversight, how might this affect the Court's analysis?

- A. It would make the case non-justiciable because private religious matters are beyond court jurisdiction.
- B. It would automatically require the temple to comply with EDA regardless of funding.
- C. It could strengthen the temple's claim to internal autonomy, though the outcome would depend on whether the practice is deemed essential.
- D. It would have no effect because constitutional morality always overrides religious freedom.

Q28. Which argument best supports the petitioner's claim that the temple must comply with anti-discrimination norms?

- A. When religious institutions perform public functions and receive state benefits, they must respect fundamental rights to equality and dignity.
- B. The state has the power to dictate all theological doctrines of religious institutions.
- C. All religious institutions must adopt modern scientific views on gender.
- D. The temple's devotees overwhelmingly support transgender priests.

Q29. Suppose the legislature amends EDA to explicitly exempt all religious institutions from anti-discrimination provisions regarding leadership roles. Under the Court's reasoning, this amendment would most likely:

- A. Be irrelevant because courts cannot review constitutional amendments.
- B. Be struck down as violating constitutional morality and the fundamental rights to equality and dignity.
- C. Be upheld because legislatures have unlimited power to define the scope of rights.
- D. Be upheld if a majority of religious institutions support it.

Q30. Which outcome best reflects the concurring judge's suggestion about supporting inclusive transitions?

- A. Mandating immediate compliance without any state support.
- B. Creating a state fund to assist religious communities in adopting inclusive practices while still enforcing rights.
- C. Allowing religious communities to opt out of anti-discrimination laws indefinitely.
- D. Privatizing all religious institutions to avoid state involvement.

Passage 7: Autonomous Vehicles, Negligence, and Manufacturer Liability

The Republic of Solara has no specific statute governing liability for accidents involving autonomous vehicles (AVs). Instead, courts apply general principles of negligence, which require proof that a defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty, and caused foreseeable harm. In a landmark case, an AV manufactured by AutoTech Inc. malfunctioned due to a software bug, causing a collision that injured a pedestrian, Ms. Rao. The vehicle's "driver" was seated in the cabin but had not touched the controls for over an hour, relying on the AV's advertised "full self-driving" capability.

Ms. Rao sued AutoTech, the software developer, and the human occupant. AutoTech argued that the human occupant was ultimately responsible for monitoring the vehicle and should be liable as the "driver." The occupant countered that the marketing and design led them to reasonably believe no monitoring was required, and that the software bug was a manufacturing defect beyond their control. Expert testimony revealed that the bug was known internally but had not been disclosed or patched before the accident.

The Supreme Court of Solara held that manufacturers of AVs owe a high duty of care to the public, given the foreseeable risks of software failures and the reliance users place on automated systems. The Court found that AutoTech's failure to disclose and fix a known bug constituted a breach of this duty. Regarding the human occupant, the Court ruled that liability depends on the level of automation and the manufacturer's representations. Where a vehicle is marketed as fully self-driving and the occupant reasonably relies on that claim, the primary duty shifts to the manufacturer, though occupants must remain ready to intervene if warnings are issued.

The Court apportioned 80% liability to AutoTech and 20% to the occupant, reasoning that while the occupant should have remained alert, the dominant cause was the undisclosed software defect. It also directed the legislature to enact a comprehensive AV liability framework clarifying duties, insurance requirements, and data access for accident reconstruction. Until such a law exists, the Court stated that courts should consider marketing claims, automation levels, and the feasibility of human intervention when allocating liability.

In a concurring opinion, one judge advocated for strict liability for manufacturers in all AV accidents involving software defects, arguing that negligence standards place too heavy a burden on victims to prove fault. The majority, however, preferred a flexible, case-by-case approach to avoid stifling innovation while ensuring accountability.

Q31. Which factor was most decisive in assigning 80% liability to AutoTech?

- A. The occupant's failure to hold the steering wheel at all times.
- B. The fact that the vehicle was expensive and marketed as a luxury product.
- C. The absence of specific AV legislation in Solara.
- D. The undisclosed, known software bug that constituted a breach of the manufacturer's high duty of care.

Q32. Under the Court's reasoning, in which scenario would the human occupant likely bear greater liability?

- A. The vehicle is marketed as fully self-driving, and the occupant sleeps during the trip without any warnings from the system.
- B. The accident is caused solely by a third party's reckless driving.
- C. The vehicle has no automation features and is driven manually by the occupant.

D. The vehicle requires constant supervision, issues clear warnings to take control, and the occupant ignores them.

Q33. Which reform would most directly address the concurring judge's concern about the burden on victims?

- A. Requiring victims to prove manufacturer negligence in every AV accident.
- B. Imposing strict liability on manufacturers for all AV accidents involving software defects.
- C. Limiting compensation to medical expenses only, excluding pain and suffering.
- D. Mandating that all AVs be driven manually in urban areas.

Q34. If Solara enacts a law stating that manufacturers are liable only if plaintiffs prove the defect was 'willful and malicious', how would this affect future cases like Ms. Rao's?

- A. It would likely bar recovery in many cases, including Ms. Rao's, because negligence or known-but-not-willful defects would be insufficient.
- B. It would automatically impose strict liability on all manufacturers.
- C. It would make it easier for plaintiffs to recover because willfulness is easy to prove.
- D. It would have no effect because courts can ignore statutes in tort cases.

Q35. Which principle best explains the Court's preference for a flexible, case-by-case approach over strict liability?

- A. A flexible approach balances accountability with the need to avoid stifling innovation in emerging technologies.
- B. Courts lack the authority to impose any form of liability on manufacturers.
- C. Strict liability is always unconstitutional in technology-related cases.
- D. Victims in AV accidents do not deserve full compensation under any legal theory.

Answers:**1. Answer: Option B**

Explanation: The passage centers on the constitutional tension between legislative/executive discretion in defining 'public purpose' for land acquisition and the requirement that such power not be arbitrary or beyond judicial scrutiny. Compensation methodology and private participation are secondary to this core issue.

2. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The majority emphasized procedural fairness and the absence of arbitrariness. Allowing the tribunal to review 'public purpose' aligns with the Court's concern that 'public purpose' cannot be a mere label, while still respecting legislative discretion in economic policy.

3. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The passage highlights that laws affecting property must not be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Proof of deliberate undervaluation would indicate bad faith and arbitrariness, directly engaging the constitutional concern. Other options are weaker or irrelevant to constitutional adequacy.

4. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The majority held that 'public purpose' requires a rational nexus to genuine public need and cannot be a mere label. A luxury resort primarily serving affluent customers may fail this test if no plausible public benefit is shown, making a rational-nexus challenge the strongest.

5. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The dissent warned about transferring land from vulnerable communities to powerful interests. Requiring social impact assessments and community consent directly mitigates this risk by empowering affected communities and introducing substantive safeguards beyond valuation.

6. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The Court's reasoning hinges on proportionality and safeguards: proactive monitoring was disproportionate and error-prone, while the takedown rule was upheld only with precise notices, clarification options, and appeal mechanisms to prevent abuse.

7. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The Court directed narrowing hate speech to cover only speech that directly incites imminent violence or discrimination. A post explicitly calling for immediate violence against a specific ethnic group fits this narrow category, whereas the others are protected expression.

8. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The concurring judge worried that fear of penalties would lead platforms to over-remove content, especially from marginalized voices discussing oppression in strong terms. Removing an activist's post describing systemic oppression exemplifies this risk.

9. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The Court required notices to specify exact content and legal basis and allowed platforms to seek clarification in complex cases. A vague notice targeting an entire profile fails this requirement; seeking clarification aligns with the Court's safeguards.

10. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court noted that automated tools are error-prone with context-dependent speech. Requiring human oversight and swift user appeals directly mitigates misclassification while preserving the benefits of automation, unlike blanket bans or harsher penalties.

11. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The Court emphasized that privacy is a fundamental right and that restrictions must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate. Warrantless access with vague standards and weak oversight failed this test.

12. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The Court allowed warrantless access only in narrowly defined emergencies where obtaining a warrant is practically impossible, with mandatory retroactive judicial validation. Routine monitoring or targeting journalists/politicians without exigency would not qualify.

13. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court concluded that only judicial authorization provides adequate checks on executive power. While a stronger oversight board helps, the majority held that prior judicial approval is essential to prevent arbitrary invasions.

14. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The Court invalidated the blanket gag order and required notification within a reasonable time unless a court specifically delays notification to protect an investigation. A blanket one-year delay for all corruption cases lacks individualized judicial justification and would likely be struck down.

15. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The Court's concern was that unfettered executive discretion without independent checks risks abuse and arbitrary privacy invasions. The lack of independence in internal certification is the core weakness, not technical training or provider verification.

16. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court focused on the Ministry's failure to provide reasoned, evidence-based justifications for overriding the FGC, emphasizing that procedural safeguards and genuine consideration of long-term impacts are essential to intergenerational equity.

17. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The Court remanded for a detailed, project-specific analysis. If the Ministry provides such analysis showing genuine consideration of alternatives and long-term impacts, the approval could be upheld, as the FGC's recommendations are not binding.

18. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The concurring judge suggested giving the FGC binding veto power in cases of irreversible harm. This change would directly prevent approvals that risk permanent ecological damage, aligning with the judge's concern.

19. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The Court treated IIA and FGC recommendations as central procedural safeguards for intergenerational equity. A blanket exception bypassing these safeguards would likely be seen as undermining the statutory and constitutional commitment to future generations.

20. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The Court found the Ministry's reliance on generic assertions insufficient, requiring project-specific, evidence-based justifications for deviating from the FGC. This procedural flaw, not community consultation or price effects, was central to the judgment.

21. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court stated that the essence of an employment relationship lies in subordination and control, not labels or income thresholds. Algorithmic control can replicate traditional employer control, making this the key criterion.

22. Answer: Option D

Explanation: Lowering the threshold to 30% would cover workers who derive at least 30% of income from one platform. Workers at 25% would still be excluded, but those between 30–50% who previously fell outside the category would now qualify.

23. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The dissent argued for full employee status for all algorithmically controlled gig workers to eliminate precarity and prevent platforms from externalizing risks. This reform directly implements the dissent's position.

24. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court required platforms to disclose key algorithmic parameters affecting work allocation and pay. Hiding performance ratings used for allocation would violate this transparency requirement.

25. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The majority emphasized the diversity of gig work and the need to avoid disrupting the entire sector at once, favoring a gradual, calibrated approach that balances protection with flexibility.

26. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The Court distinguished essential religious practices (potentially protected) from administrative or exclusionary practices that perpetuate stigma. It found the priesthood exclusion to be a discriminatory administrative rule, not an essential practice.

27. Answer: Option C

Explanation: The Court noted the temple's public engagement via tax exemptions and state regulation. A fully private, unregulated temple might have a stronger autonomy claim, though the essential-practice distinction would still matter.

28. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The petitioner's core argument, echoed by the Court, is that public-facing religious institutions receiving state benefits cannot use doctrine to justify discrimination, as they must respect constitutional equality and dignity.

29. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The Court emphasized that constitutional morality and fundamental rights to equality and dignity limit both state and private actions in the public sphere. A blanket exemption enabling discrimination would likely conflict with these constitutional guarantees.

30. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The concurring judge proposed a state fund to support transitions to inclusive practices. This balances enforcement of rights with practical support, though the majority held that financial incentives should not condition rights enforcement.

31. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court emphasized AutoTech's failure to disclose and fix a known software bug as a breach of its high duty of care, making this the dominant cause of the accident and the main reason for 80% liability.

32. Answer: Option D

Explanation: The Court said occupants must remain ready to intervene if warnings are issued. If the vehicle requires supervision, issues clear warnings, and the occupant ignores them, their breach of duty would be greater, increasing their liability share.

33. Answer: Option B

Explanation: The concurring judge advocated strict liability for manufacturers in software-defect accidents to avoid placing a heavy fault-proving burden on victims. This reform directly implements that view.

34. Answer: Option A

Explanation: A 'willful and malicious' standard is far stricter than negligence. Ms. Rao's case involved a known bug but not necessarily willful malice; such a law would likely bar recovery in many negligence-based defect cases.

35. Answer: Option A

Explanation: The majority preferred flexibility to avoid stifling innovation while ensuring accountability. This reflects a policy balance between protecting victims and allowing technological development under evolving legal standards.